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The influential twentieth-century linguistic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that real understanding rests on the precise use of language and universally agreed upon meanings.
Without clarity and common understanding, Wittgenstein observed, we can never really communicate our ideas with one-another effectively. 1 The Marine Corps' emerging concept for a Joint Task (Special Operations Capable) . 6 The results of these efforts, and the more refined notion of the JTFE that has emerged in the draft Concept paper point to the Marine Corps' intention to define the JTFE primarily as a suite of command and control hardware the forward deployed MEU(SOC) erects and initially operates before the larger Joint Task Force staff arrives in the area to assume responsibility for operations. This notion seems borne-out by the fact that the Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic, supported by the Marine Corps Systems Command, has entered into the development of a "miniaturized JTFE equipment suite" with the Sanders Division of Lockheed Martin corporation. 7 "The Enabler has already been employed as part of MEU operations," wrote the MARFORLANT commander, LtGen C. E. Wilhelm, on 18 Aug 1997 in response to LtGen Van Riper's plan to standardize the concept. 8 He goes on to add that MARFORLANT has made major strides in "developing and fielding" the JTFE, and the "value of the capability that we offer is now universally accepted by the CINCDOMS we serve." The implications seem quite clear that the emerging JTFE concept is understood by the CINCS to be a valuable piece of equipment MEU(SOC)'s carry on ______________________________________________________________________________ Atlantic, subject: "Joint Task Force (JTF) Enabler Capability, R 121100Z Aug 97. This look at the JTFE concept also incorporates the notion that the trend toward increasing urbanization in the world will necessarily see a commensurate increase of American force commitments and American military operations in urban environments. And as America's forward-deployed crisis response forces, MEU(SOC)'s will surely find themselves increasingly operating in the world's cities. In light of these assumptions, this paper aims to consider the following three questions. As a first-response force that markets a capability to better "enable"
operations by a larger Joint Task Force, can the MEU(SOC) provide a wider C2 JTF enabling capability than appears to be planned? Moreover, does the current notion of the JTFE tap the full The Intent of The JTFE Despite some lingering confusion on the "course and carry" of the concept, the purpose of the JTFE is well founded and clearly explained. Both the theory of a JTFE and the execution of the concept to-date reflect a common appreciation that the whole idea is to provide a "seamless transition" of local command and control from a MEU(SOC) commander who was the first to arrive on scene, to the JTF commander who was subsequently tasked to accomplish a wider mission. Note this sentence, as the intent is central to our later consideration of the potential of the JTFE concept. The draft Concept of 17 Oct 1997 likewise provides a clear definition, asserting that enabling is "a time-sensitive mission generally of short duration assigned to an Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) to make possible the introduction of a Joint Task Force Headquarters."
10
The comments of those who have gained some practical experience in fielding the JTF Enabler fully support this definition. In a series of articles written about the first experimental use of the JTFE during an actual deployment, the 26th MEU(SOC) public affairs staff stated that the point of The Enabler was for the MEU to "tailor its planning staff and communications assets to 'open a door' for a JTF headquarters to fall in on."
11 Reflecting on JTFE employment during the 26th MEU(SOC) deployment during late 1996 and early 1997, Col Emerson Gardner, the MEU commander explained that JTFE missions involve two phases. The first phase is an amphibious operation to secure a lodgment. "We secured an area ashore," he remarked, "using ______________________________________________________________________________
Draft Concept paper, op. cit., p. 1.
11
Sergeant Mark D. Olivia, USMC, "Seamless Transition: Marines take a giant leap into the future of joint operations," Marines (January 1997), p. 4. the MEU's major subordinate elements." Next step was to employ the Enabler. "To meet the JTF Enabler requirements," Emerson added, "we then set up a command element ashore using some additional communications equipment to support the follow--on force--the Joint Task Force."
12
This additional communications equipment is the TSC-93B+, a super high frequency satellite communications van staffed by twelve Marines that allows the user to establish an immediate and sustained secure uplink to the regional CINC. The direct value of this platform, and why it has been called The JTF Enabler is that it employs a C2 architecture familiar to the CINC staff, as well as the fact that the TSC-93B+ is compatible with communications systems regularly used by the other services in a joint operating environment. In short, not only can a MEU(SOC) commander establish effective communications with the CINC staff before the Joint Task Force arrives to assume control of an operation, but the JTF Staff can also "fall in" on familiar equipment and immediately begin to exercise command and control without first erecting another communications suite. presented as "a complete package --from satellite signal reception via TSC-93B to routers and servers to data on the screens of application systems available to operators who can translate this data into useful information." It is important to relate exactly how the JTFE concept was first fielded in order to fully understand why confusion follows the concept now. In translating the Commandant's guidance into action, the concept of a JTF Enabler capability inherent within the MEU(SOC) became a "packaged" communications system. LtGen Wilhelm summarized the JTFE capability in terms of a "C4 Package," and explained that the JTFE capability the 26th MEU(SOC) would possess and test during deployment was essentially the command and control connectivity function:
"The C2 portion of the JTF Enabler is generally additive in terms of the MEU's traditional expeditionary capabilities. The extant MEU Command Element's COC is reinforced with a 12 man communications/data support team which supports the AN/TSC-93B SHF Satellite communications terminal. Capable of pulling 512K of bandwidth, this terminal supplies the signal to the routers and servers which provide connectivity into the NIPRNET, SIPRNET, JWICS, DSN telephone and AUTODIN message networks. User applications provide access to the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), Contingency Theater Air Planning System (CTAPS), and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). The full package includes tents, generators, three HMMWV's and one five-ton truck." arrive. 18 More importantly, these functions present the foundation for a valid case that a seamless C2 transition occurs not when the JTF arrives, claims the TSC-93B, and then starts to assess the situation, but rather one when the JTF headquarters, having already been made aware of a situation developed by the MEU(SOC), arrive to assume responsibility for the operation. This is an important distinction, and it lies at the heart of the MEU(SOC)'s capacity to tap the full potential of the JTFE C2 concept.
Expanding the Potential of The JTFE for C2
The Marine Corps is clearly "on to something" with the JTFE, and the Concept paper reflects the fact that we now intend the JTFE to mean more than the deployment and setup of a sophisticated communications van. The key to tapping the full potential of the JTFE is to embrace the notion that the MEU(SOC) must become a C2 service-provider to the inbound JTF, capable of executing JTF C2 functions before the JTF arrives to assume direct control of an operation. In expanding the concept, then, we stand to achieve greater potential by determining what the JTF needs and, more specifically, by performing as many of the C2 functions the JTF staff would perform for themselves. By addressing these requirements, the MEU(SOC) JTFE allows the JTF commander and staff to assume "a work in progress" when they arrive on-scene to begin leading the operation. There are those with greater C2 expertise who are better prepared to develop these ideas more fully. However, the aim of this paper is to explore the possibility of enhancing the potential of the JTFE concept. As such, the following serves as a "line of departure" in developing the full potential of the JTFE as a C2 provider for the inbound JTF. 19 While the authors' aim was to determine the exact hardware and software resources a JTF staff needs to "plan and perform effectively," they first determined the "seventeen principal functional areas of concern of the JTF" in executing C2. These "principal functions" equate to a list of JTF "customer needs," and the MEU(SOC), therefore, can present the JTF staff with a" work in progress" if it performs these functions. In short, the TSC-93B van provides the connectivity to meet these requirements, now the Marine Corps should hasten to develop within the MEU(SOC) the capability to perform the following C2 functions for the JTF: fulfills the nation's need for a strong force-in-readiness, that is "versatile, fast-moving, and hard-hitting," and one that can be called-upon to "prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and vigorous action during their incipient stages."
21
The forces that stand the best chance of arriving on-scene early enough to "prevent the growth" of crises are our MEU(SOC)'s, whose purpose is to "provide the National Command Authorities and geographic combatant commanders with an effective means of dealing with the uncertainties of future threats, by providing forward-deployed units which offer unique opportunities for a variety of quick reaction, sea-based, crisis response options."
22 Implicit in this description of MEU(SOC) capability is the assumption that our forces, once on the ground, are going to move to solve the crisis whether a JTF is inbound or not. In those instances when the crisis will require a JTF, the Marine Corps expects to do something more than setup the TSC-93B van and perform command and control functions. And it is likewise almost certain that once communications are in place, the JTF commander will digest the MEU(SOC) commander's reports and reply, "good, Colonel, now do something productive about it until the rest of us get there." And therein lies the greatest potential of the JTFE concept --as a packaged capability that enables the JTF to quickly transition to decisive operations.
The Urban Battleground
Roger Barnett, a professor of naval warfare studies at the Naval War College recently observed that, "to achieve U.S. security objectives it is necessary to anticipate the environment in which future military operations may be conducted. and continued mass migration to cities will place great pressure on urban infrastructure --creating huge centers of disenfranchised people who come to cities seeking a better livelihood, but whose arrival, ironically, compounds the inability of their governments to provide better opportunities for them." He went on to add that, "the result is more and larger concentrations of increasingly frustrated people concentrated in mega-cities that can easily become hotbeds of governmental opposition and epicenters of local conflict, regional disruption, and international disorder." Larger JTF forces will be called upon to grapple with large-scale urban conflicts, and will certainly be necessary to fight successfully in the mega-cities of tomorrow. However, as the MCWL posits, and modern military history proves, what enables a larger force to successfully assault a city are successful operations first "in critical areas of the extended battlefield surrounding dense urban areas."
27
Could not the notion of the MEU(SOC) as a JTF Enabler include the capability to successfully operate in these critical areas of the extended urban battlefield and therefore enable the JTF to seamlessly transition to decisive operations within the city? Yes, it could because to do so increases the contribution the Marine Corps can make to national security. What would it take to provide this capability, then, and do we possess the means to pursue it? Urban Warrior is exploring new concepts for how the Marine Corps will operate in an urban environment, and the changes that will ensue from these experiments will surely enhance the future capability of a modest force to successfully "penetrate and operate in dense urban littorals." 28 The notional concept of an urban JTFE capability suggested here, however, focuses not on the MEU(SOC)'s ability to fight inside a city in the near future, but rather explores its potential to shape the urban battlefield for a larger JTF follow-on force here and now. June 5-7, 1967 (New York: Arbor, 1982 .
The IDF Filter
harbor PLO fighters. The Israeli's launched a coordinated assault to clear the city, entering from the north, east, clearing buildings and interning all suspected PLO personnel. Resistance rapidly crumbled, and that which remained was limited mostly to sniping. The Israeli attack was very deliberate, and if fired upon from a building, the IDF employed tanks in direct fire to eliminate the resistance. By June 12th, remaining PLO forces withdrew to Beirut.
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Tyre. Like Sidon, the battle for the port city of Tyre began on June 6, 1982, and the Israeli operational concept was repeated with the same stunning success. Rapid capture and neutralization of the city was seen by the Israelis as a potential means to demoralize the PLO and to compel it to accept the inevitability of an Israeli victory. The success of the Israeli plan hinged on the speed of their moves to surround the Tyre area. Conversely, from the PLO defenders' point of view, the issues were the degree to which that movement could be delayed and casualties could be inflicted on the IDF. The city was bypassed and cut off during the major thrust up the coast. The Israeli 211th Armored Brigade, which followed the main Israeli thrust up the coast, attacked Tyre from the south. A small force staged an amphibious landing at Qasmiyya on the Litani River, quickly isolated Tyre from the north, and moved on the city from this unexpected direction. A third battle group attacked Tyre from the east on June 7th.. All told, the initial Israeli assault force numbered some 6,500 troops.
The PLO defended the city with between 1,500 and 1,800 fighters. Leaflets and loudspeakers warned the inhabitants to leave the city or move to the beaches and to avoid sheltering of, or proximity to, PLO personnel. The defenders' artillery and strong-point positions on high-ground outside the city were destroyed by air strikes. Major pockets of resistance were hit by aerial bombardment and naval gunfire in support of the ground attack. The Israelis conducted aggressive reconnaissance and clearing operations. Fire was deliberately drawn from the defenders and then overwhelming firepower was brought to bear on the located position. Tanks and direct-fire artillery were extensively used in the city, however, was carefully controlled land major damage was limited to concentrated areas of resistance. As in Sidon, the Israeli forces conducted thorough house-to-house clearing within the city in PLO resistance areas.
31

Implications for the MEU(SOC)
The informed student of urban military operations should find nothing revolutionary about the Israeli experiences cited in these three case studies. What these three battles do offer, however, are some specific ideas about how MEU(SOC) forces can be employed to shape the urban battlefield in anticipation of the arrival of a larger Joint Task Force. The key feature of Israeli planning in all three of these conflicts was not to immediately and directly attack defending forces inside the city with overwhelming force from the direction from which they must expect it would come, but rather to mold a more favorable tactical situation at the outset. 32 The operational concept was to cutoff the city before the attack, and to leverage speed, surprise and movement in doing so. Three distinct advantages arise for the attacker by isolating the urban battlefield. First, it serves to prevent the escape and reinforcement of defenders inside the city.
This effectively freezes the situation inside the city and helps define the scope of the battle that may follow. Second, the act of isolating defenders brings with it the secondary and asynchronous benefit of creating a sense of isolation and hopelessness that might precipitate an earlier ______________________________________________________________________________ Ibid., p. 23. surrender at lower cost for the attackers. Third, beyond increasing the attacker's options for the direction from which to initiate decisive operations against the city, the move to surround the urban area intensifies the defender's dilemma and forces him to dissipate his forces, thereby making it easier to penetrate the city-proper at the onset of decisive operations. The operational implications for a MEU(SOC) are clear --if it can isolate the urban area quickly, or at a minimum gain and hold key terrain outside the city, it creates favorable conditions for a deliberate assault into the city. 
Ibid
Although not a factor in the three battles reviewed here, the 1987 U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory memorandum advances three "operationalized hypotheses" that have clear implications for MEU(SOC) capabilities. Their review of modern urban combat led the authors to conclude that attackers rarely consider operations against water, power, and telephone resources in their plans, despite the fact that raids against the key facilities that control these resources could have had a crippling effect on the opposition and created extraordinary problems in sustaining an organized defense. Inherent in the MEU(SOC) is the capability to conduct Direct Action Operations, which are defined as "short duration strikes and small-scale offensive action by employing precision raids…and direct assault using close quarters battle skills, emplacement of munitions and other devices, standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; or providing terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions." 35 The implications here are self-evident. Precision attacks against key water, power, and telephone infrastructure should prove to be highly effective in diminishing the urban defender's ability and willingness to resist, and the MEU(SOC) already possesses the capability to conduct precisely these kinds of attacks.
Application
The line of argument thus far runs as follows: the JTFE is a valid, though still unfinished concept, and the fact that it is still evolving provides us the with chance to continue shaping its dimensions; the intent of the JTFE is to produce a "seamless transition" of local responsibility for operations; to-date, the JTFE has emerged, and been marketed to CINCS as a sophisticated communications package for the JTF commander and staff to use when they arrive on-scene; the Marine Corps, however, recognizes some greater potential in the JTFE as a C2 concept; this paper advocates broadening the JTFE C2 concept whereby the MEU(SOC) staff actually ______________________________________________________________________________
35
Policy For (MEU(SOC)), op. cit., p. 10.
performs the JTF's C2 functions for the operation until the JTF staff arrives, organizes and assumes the "work in progress;" achieving the capability to perform these functions requires only the commitment to do so and investment in training MEU(SOC) to perform JTF C2 functions; in its role as a crisis response force, the MEU(SOC) possesses the mandate, will, and the capability to solve many crises and, to some degree, to shape nearly all; with the trend toward global urbanization, the NCA and CINC's increasingly expect to commit Joint Task Forces to operations in the urban littorals; precise, swift and early action in urban environments can create conditions that significantly favor the offense in a subsequent deliberate attack into a city; the MEU(SOC) possesses the potential to create the conditions that allow for a "seamless transition"
to deliberate offensive operations in an urban environment by a larger JTF. Having the real capability to do so, however, may require some change in MEU(SOC) organization and structure.
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The specific tradeoffs in force composition, equipment, and mission capability required to change the current organization of the MEU(SOC) are not the purview of this paper. Assessing the JTFE concept and advancing the idea for an expanded version of it is. Of the three implications for MEU(SOC) operations that emerge from the Israeli case studies only one, the benefit of robust armored forces, should have a direct impact on MEU(SOC) task organization.
Expanding the amount of armor that deploys with the MEU(SOC) unquestionably enhances its ability to mold a more favorable tactical situation at the outset of an urban conflict. In discussions with two experienced armor officers, both suggest that the LAV, vice the MlA1, provides greater flexibility and promise if more are added to the MEU(SOC) organization. this concept, and while the notion of a MEU(SOC) JTFE is still malleable, we should expand our definition and greatly enhance its scope.
The Marine Corps should develop in its forward-deployed MEU(SOC)'s a specific mission capability to perform JTFE C2 functions and to package this capability among its supporting missions profile. Moreover, anyone who looks at the future through non tinted glasses recognizes the coming increase in both MEU(SOC) and JTF urban operations. A quick response force that can effectively perform JTF C2 functions, that has a refined sense of urban intelligence requirements, the subscribes to an operational concept for urban combat emphasizing speed, flexibility, and the quick seizure and control of selected avenues of approach, that can conduct precision attacks on key urban facilities, that can recognize when it possesses the capability to resolve a crisis alone, but also retains the perspective to recognize when it can not, and which takes the initiative to shape the battlefield in anticipation of a seamless transition to deliberate operations by a larger JTF, is a force that can solve military problems in the coming years. The
Marine Corps possesses such forces already, but we must fully develop an Urban JTF Enabling capability and package it as a fifth category of operations a MEU(SOC) can perform.
39 Such a capability constitutes a much expanded definition of the JTFE, and one which begins to reflect the potential of the concept.
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The others are Amphibious Operations, Direct Action Operations, Military Operations Other Than War, and Supporting Operations.
